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Abstract:  Deciding between rival accounts of an instance of an animal’s behavior can frequently 
be achieved by experimental tests of different predictions made by the alternatives. When, 
however, one (or both) of the alternatives is expressed in terms of the mental state of the animal, 
an experimental test to distinguish them can be hard to find. Although it is unsatisfactory in many 




Geoffrey Hall is Emeritus Professor at the University of 
York, UK, and Visiting Professorial Fellow at the University 
of New South Wales, Australia. He has served as Editor of 
the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, and of 
Learning & Behavior. His primary research interest is in 
the interaction of perceptual and associative mechanisms 




Zentall’s (2016) original article, and those who have commented on it already, raise a number of 
interesting and important issues; but, at the risk of oversimplification, it may be useful to put 
many of these on one side for the time being, and focus on the following. At the heart of the 
discussion is a behavioral phenomenon (referred to as the within-trial contrast effect or as a 
justification-of-effort effect — unfortunately, there is no neutral, atheoretical, label for this 
effect), and two possible theoretical explanations of the phenomenon: within-trial contrast, and 
cognitive dissonance. Analysis of the status of these, seemingly alternative, explanations could be 
informative about the central issue. This issue I take to be: given the context provided by this 
journal, the extent to which this phenomenon tells us about “the capacity of nonhuman animals 
to feel” – specifically, to experience the mental states associated with holding conflicting items of 
knowledge, and the ability to undergo an appropriate attitude change with respect to one of 
them. 
 The behavioral phenomenon is clear and well-established. A nonhuman animal (usually a 
pigeon in the relevant studies) is allowed to choose between two apparently equivalent rewards. 
These differ only in that, in the past, one has previously been earned after a lot of work; the other, 
after only a little work. Nonetheless, the pigeon shows a preference for the former. The parallel 
with certain phenomena observed with human animals is direct. To take a classic example (from 
Aronson & Mills, 1959): young women given a hard time before being allowed to join a discussion 
group rated the activities of the group more positively than others who were allowed to join 
without trouble. Although apparently equivalent phenomena in different species might well be 
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produced by quite different mechanisms (a point well-made by Vonk, 2017), the parallel is close 
enough to encourage us to attempt to look for a common mechanism. One strategy would be to 
demonstrate that the effect seen in pigeons is the result of Zentall’s contrast effect and then to 
go on to try to show that this same mechanism is in fact the source of some or all of the 
phenomena in humans that have been attributed to cognitive dissonance. Another route would 
be to show that the cognitive dissonance process, rather than Zentall’s contrast, is in fact 
responsible for the effects obtained with pigeons. Either way, a good first step would be to assess 
the evidence that might allow us to choose between the rival accounts of the phenomenon 
observed with pigeons in the laboratory. 
 Having described the basic effect, Zentall cites a number of experimental tests of the 
theoretical explanation he offers. It is proposed that the value of an event (a stimulus signaling a 
reward) will be enhanced by the contrast with the negative state produced when a good deal of 
effort is required to obtain it. This account leads to the prediction that experiencing any relatively 
negative event (not just effort) should increase the value of the reward that follows. Zentall then 
cites a substantial set of studies that demonstrate the generality of the contrast effect — the 
reward is more valued when it is preceded by a delay, by the state of frustration produced by the 
omission of expected food, by the state of hunger experienced by the animal, and so on. The 
consistency and reliability of the effects discussed is impressive. What remains an issue, however, 
is whether they allow a choice between the alternative accounts. The effects studied are derived 
from the contrast account; but they may be readily accommodated by the dissonance account. It 
is surely possible to argue in each case that the animal is doing the mental work necessary to 
resolve the dissonance created by the fact that arriving at the (not very big) reward required a 
rather unpleasant journey. At this point, one begins to wonder whether these are really clearcut 
alternative theories that can be separated by experimental tests. Is “dissonance” better regarded 
as a term for the mental state experienced by animals (including people) under the control of 
Zentall’s contrast mechanism? If so, then a different sort of evidence might be required to resolve 
the issue. 
 Reasons to pursue this interpretation come from the study by Klein, Bhatt, and Zentall 
(2005). In this experiment, adult human participants were trained with a procedure that exactly 
paralleled the one used with pigeons to investigate justification of effort. That the experiment 
generated the same outcome with people as with pigeons is consistent with the possibility that 
contrast is responsible for both species (or that cognitive dissonance is). Significantly, in addition 
to the standard behavioral data (button presses, etc.), Klein et al. give us the results of 
introspective reports which reveal that the participants were not aware of the relation between 
amount of effort and the stimulus it was correlated with. To the extent that the processes 
responsible for dissonance reduction are assumed to operate at a level open to introspective 
report, this observation may be taken to indicate that the behavioral results are generated by 
some other mechanism (such as contrast). Yet however satisfactory it may seem initially, this 
conclusion has some gloomy implications. For relying on introspective report not only restricts 
the range of subjects available to study, it also requires us to use a very untrustworthy tool in 
conducting our studies. There is no need to belabor the point: the evidence and arguments 
showing that we are all too often mistaken or unaware of the processes responsible for our 
behavior are overwhelming (see, e.g., Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
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 In her analysis of the question of animal consciousness, Heyes (2008) allows two empirical 
approaches. One, and the one that she advocates, involves the experimental evaluation of rival 
hypotheses. Specifically, we should use “experimental methods to test against one another two 
or more alternative explanations for a focal behaviour, B. One of these hypotheses suggests that 
the behaviour is mediated by phenomenally conscious states or processes, similar to those that 
mediate the behaviour in humans, whereas the other suggests that B is mediated by alternative, 
nonconscious states and processes” (Heyes, 2008, p. 261). What I have argued is that the attempt 
to use this method to resolve alternative interpretations of experiments on justification of effort 
has failed to come up with the goods. We cannot find experimental evidence that distinguishes 
between the rival accounts. Perhaps we need to turn to Heyes’s other (and less preferred) 
strategy. 
 Heyes calls this alternative “analogical reasoning,” which she considers the one usually 
applied to spontaneously occurring behavior. I see no reason in principle it should not apply when 
the behavior is elicited by an experimental procedure. The name is new but the notion has long 
been known. It is hardly possible to improve on the description offered over a century ago by its 
first systematic exponent: 
 
… if we contemplate our own mind, we have an immediate cognizance of a certain flow of 
thoughts and feelings.… But if we contemplate mind in other persons or organisms, we have 
no such immediate cognizance.… In such cases we can only infer the existence and nature of 
thoughts and feelings from the activities of the organisms.… Hence it is evident that in our 
study of animal intelligence we are wholly restricted to the objective method. Starting from 
what I know of my own individual mind, and the activities which in my own organism they 
prompt, I proceed by analogy to infer from the observable activities of other organisms what 
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